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Cases of Note — Stealing That Dream Home Design
Copyright — Actual Damages & Disgorgement of Profits
by Bruce Strauch (The Citadel) <strauchb@citadel.edu>
Christopher Phelps & Associates v. Wayne
Galloway v. Simonini Builders, Inc., United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3117 (2007).
Wayne Galloway set out to build his
retirement home on Lake Wylie, NC south of
Charlotte. Given common misconceptions
folks have about copyright, the facts are utterly
believable. Galloway was mad at his architect
and went with his son to the more upscale Lake
Norman on the other side of Charlotte where he
saw the French-country house of his dreams.
He asked the builder — Simonini Builders
— for a copy of the plans. They referred him
to the homeowner, Mrs. Gina Bridgeford.
She figured she had paid so much for the
plans that she owned them. Her only concern
was he not put up an identical house near her.
Galloway told her he was going 30 miles
away.
Each page of the plans had a copyright
notice of Phelps & Assoc. and plainly stating
that the purchaser “is authorized to construct
one and only one home using this plan. Modification or reuse is prohibited.”
Galloway changed the name and address
from Bridgeford to Galloway, copied the
plans and set to work on his home as his own
general contractor. Some of the subs phoned
Phelps asking questions about the windows,
and thus Phelps got wind of the piracy. One of
the subs realized what was going on and tried
to warn Galloway who replied:
“They’ve got to find me, catch me first.”
Yes, how often you’ve found comfort in
that notion when you were blithely photocopying something you shouldn’t. Pages of
paper can be cached, but a house does kind
of stand out.
Well, Phelps did find out and sent Galloway a threatening lawyer letter. Galloway
stopped construction.
Phelps rushed to register their copyright,
but you’re up to date on this and know it’s not
essential to have copyright, but is essential if
you want to sue. Then Phelps sued asking
for damages, disgorgement of profits and an
injunction.
Enjoining what, you ask. And you shall
find out directly.
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The district court jury gave Phelps $20,000,
the fee normally charged for such a design.
There were no profits to disgorge.
An injunction used to belong to that old
friend the King’s Chancellor, later the Chancery Courts of England and the Equity Courts
of the US of A. Which is to say it’s not a jury
issue.
The district court denied an injunction,
saying Phelps had been made whole. Phelps
wanted the injunction to prohibit the lease or
sale of the house and the return or shredding
of the plans. Phelps of course appealed, or we
wouldn’t be reading this.
Interesting. And of course you’ve jumped
ahead of me and are asking what will happen
when Galloway kicks the bucket. Will his heirs
be enjoined from leasing or selling?
We’re in the Fourth Circuit. Appeal goes
from NC to Richmond, VA., a courtroom of dire
memory where I was once treated with contumely by a three judge panel for trying to create
an implied cause of action. But that’s a tale
I can tell in the Old Lawyer’s Home.
The Fourth Circuit said the injunction denial was perfectly proper.
Giving Phelps what they asked for
would unduly restrain the alienation
of real property.
And of course you’ve already
thought of the what if the heirs don’t
have the money to pay the taxes. They
have to lose the house to the county rather than
sell it? And what if there are multiple heirs
and they can’t agree on the use of house? The
parade of “what ifs”that would force a sale
just goes on and on.
The disgorgement of profit Phelps sought
was measured as the difference between the
cost of construction and the value of the house.
The architects claimed the house was worth
$1.1 mil for a profit of $200,000. Galloway
in turn said he had no profit were it sold, but
rather a loss of $160,000.

The Rest of the Appeal
The trial judge had instructed the jury that
the Bridgeford house plans were a derivative
work which is to say an earlier design had been
given a bit of tweaking. And he went on to say
Phelps only owned the tweaked bits and not the

preexisting material. He seemed to base this on
the fact that registration had only been done for
the Bridgeford plans and not the earlier one it
was derived from.
The Fourth Circuit said, yes, that’s true if
the underlying work was in the public domain
or owned by somebody else. But Phelps had
done the first drawing that was tweaked into
the Bridgeford one.
As to the registration of copyright, the filing
only serves to provide evidence of copyright
and is required before you can file a lawsuit.
Copyright attaches when the work is fixed in
a tangible medium. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a),
408(a), 410, 411.
Although the first design was not registered,
the registration of the Bridgeford design
sufficed for suit on the kit-and-kaboodle.
See Xoom v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279,
283-84 (4th Cir. 2003); 2 Melville B. Nimmer
& David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §
7.16[B][2][c], at 7-173 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 2006).
But it was harmless error!
The judge told the jury Phelps
was entitled to actual damages and
to all profits. See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
What he actually said was:
“Actual damages for infringement are measured according to
market value, which means what
a willing buyer would have been
reasonably required to pay a willing seller for the copyright holder’s
work.”
Which was the $20-thou that
Bridgeford paid.
Had the jury actually been paying attention to what the judge said about derivative
works, they would have merely given Phelps
the value of some altered windows.
On the profit issue, he said: “An infringer’s
profits consist of the amount of the infringer’s
gross revenues from the infringing activity
less the expenses of producing the infringing
work.”
The burden was on Galloway on the profit
issue, and the jury was apparently satisfied with
his data that showed a loss.
continued on page 57
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Cases of Note
from page 56
Now How About That Injunction?
Phelps wanted to (1) prohibit the completion of the house, and (??) (2) prohibit its sale
or lease. They argued that being made whole
was not enough. Under a threat of continuing
infringement an injunction was required. Walt
Disney Co. v. Powell, 283 U.S. App. D.C. 111,
897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The Fourth Circuit said there was nothing
automatic about injunction; it was entirely discretionary. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
Ceasing construction was moot as the house
was virtually completed.
Phelps argued that they have the exclusive
right to sell or lease their copyrighted work.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). And Galloway had
to be shut out of this possibility for the 95 year
life of the copyright.
The Fourth Circuit found an exception in
the “first sale doctrine” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
This permits a purchaser of a particular copy
(the Galloway house) to sell or otherwise
dispose of it. Galloway has paid his $20-thou
and can now sell the house.
Phelps countered that the first sale had to
be a lawful one and Galloway’s skullduggery
tainted the whole transaction and deprived him
of his rights.
The Fourth Circuit said that might be true
if the house sale was going down before the
$20-thou judgment. See, Palmetto Builders &
Designers, Inc. v. Unireal, Inc., 342 F. Supp.
2d 468,473 (D.S.C. 2004). But now after the
pay-off, the house becomes a lawfully-made
copy. The analogy was to a converter who
got sued and paid the full value of the personal property that he absconded with. He
now has title.
For you lay-folk, conversion is a blanket
civil tort for any making off with someone else’s
personal property, or chattel as it was once
called in olde Anglo Saxon. On the criminal
side this might be larceny, burglary, embezzlement, armed robbery or whatever. Which
sounds like you could covet your neighbor’s
ox or ass, but if he didn’t want to sell, you’d
take it at gunpoint and then pay him the value.
In fact, you face the criminal law as well and
will be looking at jail time. So don’t try that
in your own neighborhood.
In the case of patents and copyright, the first
sale doctrine does not merely include voluntary
sales, but might be a compulsory transfer such
as a judicial sale or court-compelled assignment. The only question is whether the patent
or copyright holder has gotten his just reward.
Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc.,
315 F2d 847,854 (2d Cir. 1963).
Phelps said a pirate taking your stuff and
then paying you the value after you sue is
equivalent to a compulsory license, which is
largely a no-no. See Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
446 n.28, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, saying
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copyright piracy was not an enforced license
because the potential damages paid by the
pirate were so much broader than just paying the standard license fee. In addition to
the actual damages and profit disgorgement,
the court might order the destruction of the
infringing article. See 17 U.S.C. § 503(b).
And in the ordinary theft type situation, this
is typically done. See, e.g., Loud Records,
LLC v. Lambright, Civ. No. 1:05-0171, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38016 (S.D. W.Va., March
30, 2006).
As to houses, it’s true they contain the
architect’s expression, but their character is
predominantly functional. Before the Berne
Convention, there was no protection for constructed architectural works at all. See 1
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, § 2.08[D][2][b], at
2-126. This was changed by the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act, but Congress
has been pretty clear about not having automat-

ic injunctions on pirated building designs.
The court talks about “encumbering” all
kinds of property along with the design such as
swimming pool, building materials, fence, etc.
What they really mean is you’d be destroying
a whole bunch of value when the copyright
owner had already been paid off. See Bucklew
v Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F3d 923,
931 (7th Cir. 2003).
What Phelps has frosted is not just the
usual moral indignation over someone taking your design, but the fact that they got no
disgorgement of profits. Otherwise, Galloway
doesn’t own their design and can’t copy it in
another house.
Unless, I guess, he rushed and built it
in its entirety before they caught him again.
Perhaps he could put up a whole sub-division
of identical Phelps’ designed French-country
houses.

Questions & Answers —
Copyright Column
Column Editor: Laura N. Gasaway (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law, Chapel Hill, NC 27599;
Phone: 919-962-2295; Fax: 919-962-1193) <laura_gasaway@unc.edu>
www.unc.edu/~unclng/gasaway.htm
QUESTION:  How are oral history recordings and transcripts affected by copyright?  
Once the interviewee is deceased, does the
library that holds the recordings and transcripts have any restrictions?
ANSWER: Oral histories present interesting copyright issues for libraries. Older
histories, such as those recorded as WPA
projects during the Depression, may have little
documentation concerning releases, etc. Today,
most interviewers require the interviewee (person being interviewed) to sign a release. The
release states what will be done with recording, the transcript, etc. Assuming that there
is no release oral histories clearly
belong to the interviewee, although
the interviewer may hold copyright
in the question he or
she poses. The most
important material,
however, is the text or
words spoken by the
interviewee, and the
interviewee owns the
copyright in his or her
words.
Through a release,
the interviewee may
give the library all rights to use, publish and
distribute via the Web an oral history. Death
of the interviewee changes only who owns the
copyright. It passes to the heirs of the deceased
interviewee; therefore, the library still may not
do as it pleases with the recording and transcript unless there was a release that permits
it to publish, distribute, etc.

QUESTION:  A library has a cost-recovery
outreach program where it provides library
services for small hospitals that do not have
a library or only have a core collection, for
attorneys and for individual health care professionals.  The program provides reference
service including searches of the literature,
training on locating medical information,
and supplies copies of books and articles,
either from its collection or via interlibrary
loan from another library.  When using interlibrary loan, does it matter if the patron is
an unaffiliated patron? Should the lending
library be notified of the status of the user?
Is this activity “systematic” distribution under
section 108(g)(1)?
ANSWER: The unaffiliated status of the
user is not particularly relevant in the interlibrary loan equation. The issue is whether the
borrowing library counts the ILL request in its
suggestion of five and pays royalties when it
exceeds the CONTU guidelines. If the user’s
request will take the library over the suggestion
of five, then royalties should be included in
the cost recovery calculation. The legislative
history that accompanied the Copyright Act
indicated that while the system of interlibrary
loan may be systematic, the use of ILL alone
does not violate section 108(g)(1).
QUESTION:   Is the library liable when
a user infringes copyright by downloading
from an electronic database an entire online
textbook?
ANSWER: Generally no. License
agreements typically detail the rights and
continued on page 58
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